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Dental services in Australia are available both privately and publicly.
However, access to public dental services, like access to public hospital
services for non-urgent treatment, is subject to a considerable waiting
period. Moreover, access to public dental services is restricted to certain
categories of welfare beneficiaries who qualify for a health care card.
Because of the waiting time for public treatment, there is a frequent callfor
more public dental resources. This paper addresses the issue of what the
waiting time for public dental services represents. One view largely
confirmed by our research is that state governments are using the waiting
time as a way of trying to push more and more people into the private
sector. We find that more and more health care card holders are using the
private sector for dental services.
Introduction
The evidence that those on low incomes have poorer oral health is irrefutable
(Spencer, 2004). Research from the Australian Institute of Health and
Welfare indicates that government health care card (HCC) holders, the so-
called socioeconomically disadvantaged, are experiencing an increased
incidence of dental problems such as toothache, discomfort with dental
appearance, and avoidance of particular foods than before (AlliW Dental
Statistics and Research Unit, 2001). Access to dental services and affordability
are the major issues as. the socioeconomically disadvantaged are unlikely to
have dental insurance to help cover costs. Moreover, oral health is an
important component of general health.
Dental services in Australia are available both privately and publicly.
However, access to public dental services, like access to public hospital
services for non-urgent treatment, is subject to a considerable waiting time.
Moreover, access to public dental services is restricted to certain categories of
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welfare beneficiaries who qualify for a HCC. Because of the waiting time for
public treatment, there is a frequent call for more public dental resources.
This paper addresses the issue of what the waiting time for public dental
services represents. One possibility for the low funding priority is that dental
care is generally considered to not be life threatening. Another possibility is
that state governments are using the waiting time as a way of trying to push
more and more people into the private sector.
Dental Policy in Australia
In Australia, Medicare or a public insurance subsidy is not available for
routine privately provided dental care. A visit to the dentist entails a number of
choices. First, an overwhelming majority of dental care, approximately ninety
percent, is provided through private clinics with or without the assistance of
private health insurance (Lavelle, 2004). Private dental treatment costs on
average A$295 per hour (National Advisory Committee on Oral Health,
2004). Although some low income households do have private health
insurance, most insurance policies are held by middle and high income
households in Australia.
Secondly, access to public dental services is available for a small co-payment,
for a limited number of services, for adults who receive welfare payments and
thus hold a HCC. Co-payments range from A$20 to A$80 for treatment and
up to A$100 for dentures (Lavelle, 2004). Public dental services are funded by
the state and territory governments. However, restrictions in funding have
resulted in considerable waiting times for services. The determinants of
waiting times and, specifically the role of government expenditure per capita
will be discussed in the next section. The accessibility problems associated
with public dental services means that many people eligible for public care
will instead access private care or receive no care.
The waiting list for public dental care in Australia is affected by two major
policy changes in the 1990s. The first change was the abolition of the
Commonwealth Dental Health Program at the end of 1996. This program was
introduced in January 1994 to provide dental treatment for adult HCC holders
and their adult dependents. Prior to January 1994, public dental treatment was
financed by State and Territory governments. The stated target of the
Commonwealth funding was to treat 1.5m patients. By the time of its abolition
at the end of 1996, the Commonwealth Dental Health Program had injected
A$245m over 3 years of extra funding into public dental services. The
funding was additional as one of the conditions of the Commonwealth Dental
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Health Program funding was that the State and Territory governments did not
reduce their funding at the same time. There are a number of indicators that
point to the success of the Commonwealth Dental Health Program. 'The
Commonwealth Dental Health Program increased the number of eligible card-
holders who received public funded dental care in any year, reduced their
waiting time, increased their satisfaction with care and moved the provision of
services in the direction of less extractions and more fillings' (Brennan, Carter,
Stewart, & Spencer, 1997).
On the 1st January 1997, the State and Territory governments resumed full
responsibility for adult public dental services. The stated reason for the
abolition was that the waiting times for public dental services had been
reduced to a satisfactory level (Lewis, 2000). However, the waiting list
quickly increased after 1996. At the time of the termination of the
Commonwealth Dental Health Program in December 1996, there were
approximately 380,000 HCC holders on public waiting lists across Australia,
representing an average waiting time of 6 months for non-emergency dental
treatment. Within a year of the end of the program, there were approximately
500,000 people nationally on waiting lists, representing waiting times ranging
from 8 months to 5 years (Parliament of Australia Senate, 2002). The increase
in the waiting time was most likely a reflection of the decline in funding after
1996. There was clearly an increase in Commonwealth funding from 1992-93
through to 1996-97 and although the States did increase their funding
contribution in the fiscal year 1996/l997, it was insufficient to compensate for
the decline in Commonwealth funding. The shortfall nationally between 1996-
97 and 1997-98 was approximately A$22m (AlliW, 2004).
The second important policy change is the introduction from 1999 onwards of
a series of measures to encourage higher participation in private health
insurance. Three new policies designed to increase the numbers insured were
introduced over a three year time period from July 1997 to July 2000. Since
the policy changes, the percentage of the population with private insurance has
increased markedly. For the purposes of this paper, we concentrate on
ancillary insurance as it provides cover for private dental services. In the year
ended June 1997, 31.6 percent of the Australian population held ancillary
insurance. In the year ended June 2001, after the introduction of the policy
changes, this percentage had jumped to 40.5. This is an increase of 28 percent
over 4 years. In later figures, for the year ended June 2003, the percentage had
increased further to 41.2 (PHIAC, 2003).
Of these measures, the most controversial was the 30 percent rebate on all
private health insurance policies which was introduced in January 1999.
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Through this rebate, the Commonwealth government subsidises private dental
treatment through its private health insurance rebate. As the wealthier are
more likely to hold private health insurance, they are also the beneficiaries of
this policy. In 2001, 82.5 percent of Australian households in the highest
income quintile had private health insurance compared with 29.5 percent in
the lowest income quintile (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2000). The
subsidy to private dental practice in Australia associated with this rebate was
approximately A$285 million in 2001-02 (AlliW, 2004).
Factors influencing the waiting list
A waiting list is a response to a situation where demand exceeds supply. ]f
price is below its equilibrium value, it is either because of price controls or
because the service is free to consumers. The waiting list thus acts as a
rationing device for HCC holders who do not pay the market clearing fee for
dental services (Martin & Smith, 1999) in spite of the fact that all the States
and Territories governments have introduced small co-payments,
The assessment of a waiting list for dental care crucially hinges on one's
conception of dental health. In his seminal paper, Arrow argued that medical
care is different to other goods and services because an individual's demand is
unpredictable in terms of timing and costs and the demand intensifies when a
person is ill (Arrow, 1963).
Sintonen and Linnosmaa (2000), however propose that dental care is
different to medical care for a number of reasons. First, the number of dental
diseases is relatively few and their occurrence is more predictable than is the
case with medical care. Furthermore, individuals experience the same dental
procedures several times in their lifetime and therefore can learn from the
experiences about the quality and quantity of the services and the cost. Finally,
most dental diseases are not contagious. Thus the externality argument often
advanced with medical care in general does not apply.
Furthermore in addition to regular dental care, good oral health is a
consequence of a complex interaction of biological, social, economics,
cultural and environmental factors (National Advisory Committee on Oral
Health, 2004). Unlike some health care individuals can put their own time
into dental care and improve their dental health status. Conversely, poor oral
health can be related to poor diet and nutrition, smoking and excessive alcohol
consumption, lack of fluoride in the water during childhood, injury and poor
oral health practices (Department of Health, 2005).
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Access to dental care may be urgent where there is an accident or infection.
But even in the case of an emergency, dental illness is infrequently life-
threatening. In Australia, oral infection may be treated quickly either at the
GPs surgery or at emergency departments of public hospitals.
What does the waiting list for public dental services reflect? On the demand
side, the Australian population who has access to public dental services is
restricted to HCC holders. The mix of socioeconomic characteristics in this
subpopulation that impact on need for dental services include age and gender.
Dental status declines with age in the same way that health status does.
Against that trend, the fact that older people are more likely to have dentures,
and thus require less frequent dental visits, also has to be taken into account.
Unlike the demand for some medical care, there is no obvious biological
explanation of why women should seek more dental care than men.
Nonetheless our earlier research indicates that women do use more dental
services than men (Hopkins and Kidd, 2005) which is in accordance with the
evidence that women are more likely than men to use health services generally
(Roberts-Thomson & Stewart, 2003) .
Income also impacts on the demand for dental services but in a complex way.
On the one hand, an increase in income may mean that a person no longer
qualifies for a HCC. In that case, demand exerted by HCC holders drops, and
the waiting list is reduced. Alternatively, the person may use the extra income
to purchase ancillary PHI while still qualifying for HCC. . In this case, the
person can either choose to continue to wait for public services or use private
dental services. Finally, a person with a higher income than previously may
choose to self-insure, that is pay directly for the use of private dental services.
The supply of dental services is a function of financial, incentives and physical
and human resources. While available econometric evidence for Australia is
lacking with regard to supply, reduced form estimates suggest that higher
capacity, in terms of increased numbers of beds and doctors, is associated with
lower waiting times (Hurst & Siciliani, 2003; Martin & Smith, 1999). Thus
one would expect that the waiting time for dental services would decline with
more public dental facilities including dental personnel.
Financial resources are generally used as a proxy for all resources. The
productivity or efficiency with which these resources are used also impacts on
the supply of dental services. Productivity is influenced by many things but an
important issue is the type of remuneration for health specialists. For example,
there is considerable evidence that different types of payments should cause
different types of work patterns by professionals. Up to this point, it has been
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implicitly assumed that demand and supply jointly determine waiting time and
waiting lists not vice versa. However, waiting time constitutes an imperfect
nonfinancial barrier against the use of dental services. The direct constraining
effect on dental demand has not been studied in the case of Australia. Its
indirect effect is to encourage purchase of PHI in order avoid the waiting time
for public services. In the case of medical services, this response has been
examined. using NHS public hospital data where it was found that people
are more likely to purchase PHI when the waiting list increases (Besley, Hall,
& Preston, 1999).
Waiting time is also likely to have an impact on the supply side. On the one
hand, it is conceivable that professional ethics induce practitioners to work
longer hours in an attempt to relieve their patients from suffering. On the other
hand, there is again an indirect effect as political decision makers are likely to
devote more resources to a service characterised by a lengthy waiting time.
This tendency for 'money to follow the queue' certainly appears to hold in the
case of hospital services (Hurst & Siciliani, 2003). It seems unlikely however,
that dental services would have the same electoral appeal.
The determinants of waiting
In this section we examine the factors on both the demand and the supply side
that are hypothesised to influence the waiting list for public dental services in
Australia.
Table ] presents evidence on the time dimension of waiting from the five
largest Australian States [ New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (Vic),
Queensland (Qld), South Australia (SA) and Western Australia (WA)]. The
data were collected by the various State departments of health using their own
criteria, and thus creating the risk of inconsistency. Since public dental
services in Australia are a State rather than Federal responsibility, there is no
national data on waiting times for public dental services.
The data presented in Table 1 roughly aligns with the National Health Surveys
(NHS) of 1995/96 and 2001 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1995, 2001). The
NHS are used for further data analysis below. The two time periods neatly
straddle the policy changes. Thus, 1995/96 is around the time that the
Commonwealth Dental Health Program was abolished but before the increase
in the proportion of the population with PHI. As mentioned earlier, 3].6
percent of the population had PHI in June ]997. By June 200], this had
jumped to 40.5.
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Table 1: Waiting time per Australian State, 1995/96 and 2001102
1995/96 2001102
Waiting time L Waiting timez
NSW 58 months 54 months
Vic 16 months 22 months
Qld 10 months 17 months
SA 22 months 43 months
WA 8 months 10 months
. . ..1. Waiting lists and times for public dental care source report to Ministers for Health 2000
data for mid 1996 and 2000
2. Waiting list for public dental care ('Healthy mouths, healthy lives') June 2002
Source: National Advisory Committee on Oral Health 'Health Mouths Healthy Lives:
Australia's National Oral Health Plan 2004-20 l3, July 2004, Australian Health Ministers'
Conference
There is clearly a considerable wait for public dental services in some States
with NSW exhibiting maximum values of 58 and 54 months respectively. In
all States except NSW, the waiting time increased between 1995/96 and
2001/02 and even doubled from 22 to 43 months in SA.
Following the hypothesis laid out above, public expenditure on dental care is a
crucial determinant of supply and hence should be inversely related to the
average waiting time. In Table 1, Vic and Qld consistently are among the
States with comparatively short waiting periods. In the case of Qld, the likely
explanation is its dental expenditure of A$27 per capita average over 1995 to
2003 (Table 2). The situation in Vic presents somewhat of a puzzle; its waiting
being not much higher than in Qld (22 months compared to 17 months in
2001/2) although the per capita dental expenditure is a mere one-half of that
pertaining to Qld. On the other hand, NSW expenditure figures are the lowest
and it does have the longest waiting time for HCC holders.
32 Journal of Economic and Social Policy
Table 2: Public dental expenditure per capita, 1995-2003
(average annual)
Dental expenditure
per capita, A$
NSW 10.82
Vic 13.48
Qld 27.03
SA 18.50
WA 19.34
Source: Australian Health Expenditure (AlliW, 2004)
At this point, an attempt is made at refining the analysis with regard to the
demand side by first distinguishing HCC holders from the rest of the
population and then differentiating between HCC holders with and without
PHI. The data in Tables 3 and 4 (covering the years 1995 and 2001
respectively) have been extracted from the NHS. The 1995 survey consists of
53,828 unit records of individuals who form 23,800 households. The 2001
survey comprises observations on 26,900 individuals. The figures discussed
here relate to aged 18 and over.
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Table 3: .Time since last dental visit, age, gender and income by insurance
and health care card status, 1995
(I) (2) (3) (4)
All sample All HCC HCC HCC
aged 18 & holders holders holders
over without PHI with PHI
Australia
No. 35101 1105 I 4270 968
Female (percent) 51.8 6004 5804 6504
Age (mean) 40.75 50.26 48.14 52.69
Annual income (mean A$) 18416 7435 7047 8676
Months since last dental visit (mean) 9.20 10.50 11.11 7.942
NSW
No. 5413 1688 700 127
Female (percent) 5204 58.0 58.8 61.9
Age (mean) 42.15 53.05 51.15 57.94
Annual income (mean A$) 18824 7297 7089 8095
Months since last dental visit (mean) 8.87 10.12 10.63 6.60
Victoria
No. 9001 2894 1065 198
Female (percent) 5204 61.4 57.5 69.2
Age (mean) 41.13 50045 47.5 52.05
Annual income (mean A$) 17603 7123 7000 8081
Months since last dental visit (mean) 9040 11.0 11.65 9.09
Oueensland
No. 4329 1472 551 87
Female (percent) 51.7 60.7 6004 65.5
Age (mean) 41.0 51.0 49.58 54.37
Annual income (mean A$) 16967 7160 7078 5977
Months since last dental visit (mean) 9044 10.77 11.50 6.69
South Australia
No. 5949 2201 845 241
Female (percent) 51.6 59.9 58.5 64.7
Age (mean) 42.3 52.0 49.15 55.10
Annual income (mean A$) 15922 6774 6550 7241
Months since last dental visit (mean) 8.87 9.84 10.62 7.92
Western Austl'alia
No. 3379 1046 400 139
Female (percent) 51.6 60.8 57.0 65.5
Age (mean) 4004 50.3 48045 54.88
Annual income (mean A$) 18096 7892 7675 9281
Months since last dental visit (mean) 9046 10043 10.70 8042
Source: ABS NHS 1995
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First, comparing the full sample with the sample of HCC holders shows the
latter are older by approximately 10 years, more likely to be female and to
have considerably lower incomes. In 1995, the income of HCC holders is
A$7,400 compared with A$18,000 for all adults. The relative gap is the same
magnitude in 2001. The indicator of dental care consumed is the mean time
elapsed since the last dental visit. The theoretical .considerations expanded
above result in ambiguous predictions. While HCC holders have lower
incomes, their demand for dental care is boosted by their higher age, and most
importantly, the reduced unit price of care they face. A comparison of columns
1 and 2 of Tables 3 and 4 suggests that the income (and age) effect prevails
over the price effect, in that the time elapsed since the last dental contact is
consistently higher for HCC holders than the general population. For example
in 2001, the last dental visit was 10.2 months ago among HCC holders but
only 9.01 months ago in the general adult population of Australia. The
question now arises of whether income or insurance coverage is the decisive
determinant of demand for dental care. Income and PHI are strongly
correlated. In order to keep income constant (roughly), the comparison
between those with and without PHI is limited to HCC holders (see columns 3
and 4 of Tables 3 and 4). The data show that the time elapsed is consistently
lower among HCC holders who have PHI coverage, pointing to more frequent
utilisation of dental care. In 1995, the value for those with PHI was 7.94 for
Australia as a whole, compared to 11.11 months among HCC holders without
PHI. Note that these 7.94 months even compare favourably with the 9.20
months characterising the adult population overall.. Interestingly, the
differential increased between 1995 and 2001, again consistently in all states.
Among HCC holders with PHI coverage, the time since last dental visit
dropped from 7.94 to 6.75 months, while it increased slightly from 11.11 to
11.19 in the general population. While several factors may be responsible for
this divergent development over time, it cannot be public care of the poor,
since the cuts at the Federal level were not counterbalanced by extra funds at
the state level. Therefore, the decisive determinant may again be insurance
coverage. In 1995, only 8.8 percent of HCC holders had PHI. This percentage
had jumped to 20.9 percent by 2001 (Table 5). This sizeable increase in the
proportion of the HCC holders with PHI occurred in all states; therefore it
likely constitutes a response to the government policy changes including a 30
percent premium subsidy.
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Table 4: Time since last dental visit, age, gender and income by insurance
and health care card status, 2001
(l) (2) (3) (4)
All sample All HCC HCC HCC
aged 18 & holders holders holders
over without PHI with PHI
Australia
No. 16646 6510 5147 1363
Female (percent) 54.09 61.83 61.61 62.66
Age (mean) 46.40 55.3 54.27 59.07
Annual income (mean A$) 20915 10863 10403 12601
Months since last dental visit (mean) 9.0l 10.2 11.19 6.75
NSW
No. 3417 1397 1149 248
Female (percent) 55.87 60.92 60.84 61.29
Age (mean) 46.82 57.34 56.79 59.85
Annual income (mean A$) 20117 10426 10286 ll868
Months since last dental visit (mean) 9.08 10.05 10.88 6.22
Victoria
No. 3207 1287 1092 195
Female (percent) 58.59 63.56 62.64 68.72
Age (mean) 46.29 56.11 55.51 59.43
Annual income (mean A$) 19408 10218 10133 12933
Months since last dental visit (mean) 9.24 10.78 11.53 6.55
Queensland
No. 2806 1249 1016 233
Female (percent) 55.42 62.45 62.7 61.37
Aj1;e (mean) 46.02 53.81 52.60 59.09
Annual income (mean A$) 19286 10767 10392 12453
Months since last dental visit (mean) 9.33 10.04 10.8 6.72
South Australia
No. 1849 896 666 230
Female (percent) 54.14 62.61 61.11 66.96
Age (mean) 47.58 55.22 53.66 59.74
Annual income (mean A$) 19532 10945 10603 11938
Months since last dental visit (mean) 8.82 9.80 ll.Ol 6.31
Western Australia
No. 1906 759 517 242
Female (percent) 55.5 59.68 58.61 61.98
Age (mean) 45.27 54.23 52.08 58.81
Annual income (mean A$) 19512 10982 10812 11345
Months since last dental visit (mean) 8.81 9.78 10.97 7.24
Source: ABS NHS 2001
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The fact that a rather high percentage of HCC holders have PHI in 2001
reflects, amongst other things, their heterogeneity. They range from people
who are young and welfare dependent to those who are old and low income
but asset rich. HCC holders in the NHS also includes Veterans who have more
immediate access to dental care (Spencer, 2004). These two observations serve
to confirm the assertion stated in a earlier paper .that letting HCC holders
benefit from public dental services fails to achieve much redistribution in
favour of the indigent (Hopkins & Kidd, 2005). It would be more effective to
target directly lower socioeconomic groups regardless of HCC status.
What we cannot tell from the data in Tables 3 and 4 is whether HCC holders
obtain dental care publicly or privately. Spencer (2004) notes that
approximately one third of the adult population is eligible for public dental
care, yet only 30 percent of those eligible actually obtain care publicly.
Finally, we hypothesised that longer waiting may encourage people into PHI
and thus into the private sector. On the basis of the long waiting times for
public dental services in NSW (Table 1), one would anticipate that in that
state, more HCC holders would hold PHI than elsewhere in Australia.
According to Table 5, however, proportion of HCC holders with PHI in NSW
is smaller than the national average. The fact that NSW, while having a share
of HCC holders of about 40 percent (which is close to the average) has so few
with PHI indicates that few HCC holders are able to leave the queue thanks to
PHI, causing waiting times to be high. In accordance with this interpretation of
the causal link, WA with its highest share of HCC holders having PHI also
exhibits the shortest waiting time (see Tables 1 and 5). However only a fully
specified econometric model and much better data could possibly solve the
identification problem plaguing this discussion.
Table 5: Hee holders with PHI, 1995 and 2001
( t)lpercen
1995 2001
Australia 8.8 20.9
NSW 7.5 17.8
Vic 6.8 15.2
Qld 5.9 18.7
SA 10.9 25.7
WA 13.3 31.9
Source: ABS NHS 1995 & 2001
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Queensland for example has always had a strong public sector in health care
provision and this is reflected in a high per capita public outlay on dental care
and a lower proportion of PHI in that state (Tables 2 and 5). On the other
hand, the notion that more PHI might help reduce the waiting time is
challenged by the noting that the waiting time for public dental services in all
States apart from NSW (Table 2) has increased over the same period when the
proportion of HCC holders with PHI has increased quite dramatically.
Policy implications
The issue of the whether public dental services are funded appropriately or not
and thus whether the waiting time for treatment is too long is a complex one.
The issue of the debate is not effectiveness (that is whether public expenditure
results in good oral health in spite of waiting for public dental services); it is
also about distribution (that is whether public expenditure is sufficient to
ensure that the poor have access to dental care). In fact, surveys of the dental
health of the aged and HCC holders consistently reveal higher rates of lost
teeth and edentulism (Spencer, 2004).
Focusing on the distributional issue is complicated by the fact that some HCC
holders have private health insurance (PHI) which frequently enables then to
avoid waiting for public services. Their share increased from 6.7 percent in
1995 to 19.6 percent in 2001. As more HCC holders are bypassing the public
dental queue by purchasing and accessing private services, they may free up
the limited public services for those HCC holders without PHI.
In public dental services, the Australian government thus may have achieved
what it tried but failed to achieve in the case of public hospital services. The
objective of inducing people to purchase PHI using various policy changes in
the period 1999 to 2001 was to enable more citizens to use private hospital
services and to thereby reduce the public hospital queue. Most of the available
evidence seems to suggest that the objective has not been met (Hopkins &
Zweifel, 2006). By way of contrast, the present study finds that time since the
last dental visit has decreased among HCC holders with PHI coverage
(column 4 of Tables 3 and 4) between 1995 and 2001. This achievement is the
more remarkable as the Federal government had cut its spending with the State
governments failing to fill the gap. As with many other areas of health and
welfare expenditure and service provision in Australia, there is a distributional
issue too. It concerns two levels of government, Federal and State, who debate
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the responsibility for the service rather than the appropriate level of funding
and the funding priorities.
The fact that a group of people, while deemed to qualify for access to public
dental services, have such poor access that they feel compelled to purchase
PHI for improved access is idiosyncratic.. One way to see this is as an
unintended lack of precision in the targeting of public dental services, caused
by the fact that HCC holding is an imperfect indicator of low income. The
other amounts to the ongoing suspicion about the public commitment to oral
health of genuinely disadvantaged groups of people.
However, it is worthy of note that the Federal Labor Government elected in
2007 recently announced the first installment of its new dental plan under
which it will contribute $290 million in a Commonwealth Dental Health
Program with the aim of providing additional care and reducing public dental
waiting lists (Roxon, 2008). Ongoing monitoring of the new program will be
necessary to ensure that stated targets are met.
Conclusions
The issues of who gets dental care, who gets access to public dental services
and how quickly are critical ones. They bring into focus some broader
questions concerning the Australian health and welfare system, viz. the
allocation of health care cards (HCC) that grant treatment at low or no charge
and the role of the government in the division of health services between the
public and private sectors. Whilst the government would in all probability
argue that it has no role in private dental services, it does subsidise private
practice through its 30 percent rebate on the premiums PHI policies.
There is an ongoing discussion amongst members of the Australian dental
profession about the best way to induce more dentists into the public sector,
noting financial incentives for practice are not as attractive as in the private
sector. Supplier incentives in dental care are a highly contentious issue in
many OECD countries. For example, in the UK there has been some
discussion of shifting from a curative to preventive model requiring a change
in provider payments from fee-for-service to capitation (Robinson, Patel, &
Pennycate, 2004).
In most OECD countries, government policy with regard to dental services
tends to be piecemeal, reflecting the fact that poor dental health is rarely life
threatening. This is in spite of Australian and international evidence
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suggesting that widespread incidence of poor dental health imposes
considerable costs on individuals by restricting their normal functioning.
Moreover, neglect of teeth now creates a need for more expensive care later
and oral diseases are the fourth most expensive diseases to treat(Petersen,
Bourgeois, Ogawa, Estupian-Day, & Ndiaye, 2005). Thus, timely access to
dental care is important but we find that not all Australians have it.
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